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Essays on Imperfect Competition  
in the Labor Market 
Sydnee Caldwell 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine 
the impact of imperfect competition in the labor market on 
wage growth and wage inequality. Chapter 1, coauthored 
with Nikolaj Harmon, investigates the link between an indi-
vidual’s wages and her outside labor market opportunities. 
To overcome the fact that many factors that shift an individu-
al’s outside opportunities also impact her productivity at her 
current job, we develop a novel identification strategy that 
generates within-individual (and within-firm-by-occupation) 
variation in workers’ information about their outside options. 
This strategy, which we implement using monthly employer- 
employee data from Denmark, exploits the fact that indi-
viduals often learn about job opportunities through their 
social networks. Using this strategy we find that changes in 
workers’ outside labor market opportunities are reflected in 
both mobility and wage growth, even for individuals who do 
not switch firms. 
The reduced-form results in Chapter 1 are inconsistent 
with perfect competition and provide empirical support for 
a large class of on-the-job search models where workers 
are able to leverage outside offers into wage increases at 
the incumbent firm (Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006; 
Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002). The results in this chapter 
therefore suggest that policies that improve workers’ ability 
to receive or accept job offers while employed can raise 
wages. These policies could include restrictions on firms’ 
use of noncompete or nonsolicitation agreements or harsh 
punishments for firms’ use of no-poach clauses. The results 
further suggest that industrial policies that promote “good 
jobs” may, through improving workers’ outside options, 
benefit a broad set of workers—not simply the workers who 
get those jobs (Acemoglu 2001). 
Chapter 2, coauthored with Oren Danieli, investigates the 
role that cross-sectional differences in individuals’ outside 
options play in generating between-group wage inequality. 
We use a two-sided matching model to micro-found a mea-
sure of workers’ outside options, which we call the outside 
options index. We then use German administrative data to 
estimate this index and use two sources of variation: 1) the 
introduction of high-speed trains and 2) a standard shift-
share instrument to identify the elasticity between our index 
and wages. When we combine our measure of options with 
this elasticity, we find that roughly one-third of the gender 
wage gap in Germany can be explained by differences in 
options, mostly the result of differences in effective labor 
market size. 
Chapter 3, coauthored with Emily Oehlsen, investigates 
whether, in the absence of commuting costs, monopsonistic 
firms have an incentive to pay women less. The chapter uses 
data from a series of experiments, conducted in collabo-
ration with a national ride-share company, to estimate the 
elasticity of men’s and women’s labor supply to both the 
market (Frisch elasticities) and the firm. These elasticities 
are sufficient to calculate the firm’s optimal gender wage gap 
in settings where hours are flexible and settings where they 
are not. We find that women are twice as elastic as men are 
to the market: in response to a 10 percent increase in wages, 
they work 7 percent more compared to 3 percent more. This 
does not reverse at the firm level; both men and women 
have firm-specific elasticities of between 2 and 4, and there 
is no evidence that women are less elastic than men. These 
elasticities suggest optimal wage-markdowns of between 20 
and 33 percent. The results also indicate that, in the absence 
of commuting costs, firms have no incentive to pay equally 
productive women less than their male counterparts. 
Together, the second and third chapters show that there 
are differences in the option sets that men and women face 
in the labor market, and that these differences contribute to 
the gender wage gap. However, these chapters also suggest 
that much of the outside options gap is the result of dif-
ferences in willingness or ability to commute. To that end, 
policies that make it easier for women—particularly those 
with children—to commute or to access child care near their 
desired place of work may be an effective tool in combating 
the gender gap. 
Chapter 1
Outside Options, Bargaining, and Wages: 
Evidence from Coworker Networks 
(with Nikolaj Harmon)
There is growing evidence that imperfect competition 
and frictions in the labor market have a significant impact 
on the wage distribution (Barth et al. 2016; Card, Heining, 
and Kline 2013; Card et al. 2016). In such a labor market, 
workers’ wages depend not only on their productivity, but 
on the characteristics of the firm for which they work and 
on the characteristics of the firms for which they could have 
worked.1 A growing number of papers have documented that 
equally skilled workers earn different amounts depending on 
where they work (see, e.g. Barth et al. 2016; Card, Heining, 
and Kline 2013; Song et al. 2015). However, to date, there 
is little empirical evidence on the link between workers’ 
outside options and their wages.2 If two workers at a firm are 
equally productive, does the worker with better opportunities 
at other firms—or better information about these opportuni-
ties—earn more? Can workers renegotiate their wage with 
their current firm if they receive an outside offer?
The link between an individual’s outside labor market 
opportunities and her wages is important both for distin-
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guishing between different models of wage-setting and for 
understanding how recent developments in the labor market, 
including the use of no-poach and nonsolicitation agree-
ments (which reduce workers’ ability to receive offers while 
employed), will impact wages. However, examining this link 
empirically is challenging both because outside options are 
not observed in standard data sets and because most factors 
that shift workers’ outside options also shift their productiv-
ity in their current job. This is a problem because changes 
in productivity at the incumbent firm should impact wages, 
even if the labor market is perfectly competitive. 
This paper overcomes these challenges by combining a 
novel identification strategy that exploits changes in work-
ers’ information about their outside opportunities with rich 
administrative data that contain high-frequency (monthly) 
wage data and detailed measures of workers’ skills. The 
empirical strategy is motivated by a large literature, pio-
neered by Granovetter, that documents how workers learn 
about job opportunities through their social networks 
(Granovetter 1973; Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004; Topa 
2011).3 We create measures of a worker’s information about 
outside opportunities by weighting firm-specific changes in 
labor demand by each worker’s unique coworker network. 
These networks consist of the set of individuals a worker has 
worked with in the recent past but is no longer working with. 
They allow us to identify which new positions an individual 
is likely to hear about. Because networks vary across work-
ers within an occupation, and even within a firm-and- 
occupation group, we are able to exploit differences in infor-
mation between workers within a narrow skill group. 
We implement this approach using a new monthly linked 
employer-employee database covering the universe of 
employees at Danish firms. While wages in Denmark were 
historically set by union bargaining, firms today have con-
siderable latitude to negotiate wages with individual employ-
ees (Dahl, Le Marie, and Munch 2013). Our data cover the 
period after decentralization.4 The data contain information 
on individuals’ monthly earnings and hours worked, and on 
their six-digit industry and occupation.
We start by deriving our measure of outside options from 
a standard on-the-job search model where firms renegotiate 
wages with workers that receive outside offers (Postel-Vinay 
and Robin 2002; Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006). The 
model allows us to illustrate the two key predictions of this 
class of models. First, workers who receive outside offers 
from more productive firms leave. Second, workers who 
receive outside offers from less-productive firms that domi-
nate their current position renegotiate. We modify the model 
to allow workers to learn about job opportunities through 
both public sources and their individual-specific social 
networks to derive a measure of outside options that we can 
take to the data. 
We then test the key predictions of this model by regress-
ing indicators for mobility and measures of wage growth 
on our individual- and time-specific measures of outside 
options. Our baseline measure weights the number of new 
positions at each firm by an individual’s exposure to that firm 
through their coworker network. The identifying assumption 
is that, conditional on the included covariates, unobserved 
determinants of individual mobility or wage growth are 
uncorrelated with time-varying labor demand at an individ-
ual’s former coworkers’ current firms. In order to focus on 
variation in outside options over time for a given worker, 
we include worker fixed effects in all of our specifications. 
We also control, nonparametrically, for month- and (four-
digit) industry-specific demand shocks. The primary threat to 
validity, which we address through a series of distinct tests, 
is that the coworker networks proxy for specific types of 
skills, and that there are unobserved month-specific changes 
in demand for these skills, which are correlated with unob-
served determinants of job-to-job mobility and wage growth.
We present nonparametric evidence that confirms both 
predictions of the theoretical model: changes in workers’ 
information about their outside opportunities lead to mobility 
and wage growth, and larger changes are necessary to induce 
a job-to-job transition than to induce a wage change. Vir-
tually all of the increased mobility is the result of moves to 
firms where the worker has a former coworker. This is con-
sistent with the idea that workers learned about the opportu-
nity through their former colleagues. We find that an addi-
tional 10 new positions at an individual’s former coworkers’ 
current firms results in a 15 percent higher probability that 
the worker makes a job-to-job transition that month.5 The 
same change translates to an approximate $50 increase in 
earnings over the course of the year. However, most individ-
uals do not renegotiate: the impact on whether an individual 
sees an earnings gain is less than a percentage point. If all 
the gains were associated with gains for workers who were 
driven to renegotiate (see a positive earnings change), the 
average full-time worker would see an 11 percent increase in 
base pay. 
Both job-stayers and job-movers see higher wages in 
response to changes in their outside options; job-stayers 
obtain roughly 20 percent the earnings gain of job-movers. 
Posting models—such as monopsony models—would pre-
dict a ratio of zero: wages do not adjust unless the individual 
switches firms. Spot market models where wages freely 
fluctuate in response to changes in demand for a worker’s 
skill would predict a ratio of one. We are able to reject both 
of these extremes. 
Several distinct pieces of evidence suggest that our results 
are not driven by unobserved changes in demand for work-
ers’ skills. First, we show that the estimates are stable when 
adding more detailed nonparametric controls for changes 
in demand for different occupation or skill groups. These 
controls are based on different combinations of our industry, 
occupation, and education fixed effects. Second, we show 
that the results are also robust to adopting a within-firm 
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identification strategy that exploits variation in coworker net-
works that emerges from differences in tenure at the current 
firm and at past firms. The evidence is most consistent with 
worker-initiated renegotiation, not firm-initiated raises. If 
the earnings changes were the result of firms learning about 
the market price of their workers’ skills, we would expect 
all workers within the same firm and occupation to see equal 
wage growth. 
In order to further show that our results are driven by 
changes in workers’ information, and not changes in work-
ers’ productivity, we decompose our measure of outside 
options into portions that come from different subsets of an 
individual’s former coworkers. We find that the changes in 
earnings are driven by changes in labor demand at the firms 
of closely connected former coworkers: those who work in 
the same administrative region and those whom the indi-
vidual worked with in the more recent past. Placebo tests 
exploiting an individual’s future coworkers—coworkers the 
individual has not met yet—tell a similar story. If the results 
were driven by unobserved demand shocks, we would expect 
measures constructed using these coworkers to have a similar 
impact on mobility and wage growth. We would also expect 
that adding these measures as controls to our baseline regres-
sion would shrink our estimates.6
In the last part of the paper we divide workers into eight 
broad occupation groups and reestimate the effects within 
each group.7 We find that the impact on workers in the high-
est skill group (professionals) is double that of workers in the 
middle skill group (technicians), and nearly five times that of 
workers in the least skilled group. Within each skill group, 
women benefit less than men. Because workers in higher 
skill groups also have higher baseline earnings—and men 
have higher baseline earnings than women—this heteroge-
neity translates into substantial differences in earnings. The 
heterogeneity does not appear to be driven by differences in 
the quality of our measure for different groups of workers: 
the impacts on mobility do not differ across groups. 
To identify whether the heterogeneity across skill groups 
is due to differences in wage-setting strategies or differences 
in workers’ bargaining power, we then use our reduced-form 
estimates to identify a structural search model incorporating 
on-the-job search and a mass of posting firms (Flinn and 
Mullins 2017). Intuitively, the impact on whether there is a 
wage change is informative about the fraction of firms that 
post wages; the impact on wages identifies workers’ bargain-
ing power. We estimate this model using a simulated method 
of moments. We find that the reduced-form heterogeneity 
is largely driven by differences in wage-setting strategies, 
not bargaining power: wage renegotiation (posting) is more 
common among high- (low-) skilled workers. Using our 
estimated parameters, we show that a reduction in the arrival 
rate for employed workers would lead to a significant reduc-
tion in wage growth. For high-skilled workers, much of this 
is due to decreased on-the-job bargaining; for lower-skilled 
workers this is mostly due to decreased mobility. 
Chapter 2
Outside Options in the Labor Market 
(with Oren Danieli)
In almost every model of the labor market, wages depend 
on a worker’s outside options: the amount of compensation 
she could receive from different employers. In a perfectly 
competitive labor market, an equally attractive outside option 
always exists, and competition between identical employ-
ers sets compensation at the marginal product. However, in 
reality, a worker’s next best option could require a different 
combination of her skills, could involve different working 
hours, or could be located in a different city. The number 
of outside options could be systematically lower for some 
workers because of the health of their local labor market, 
because they are unwilling or unable to commute, or because 
their skills are valuable only for a few employers or indus-
tries. Such differences could have significant implications for 
their incomes. 
A key challenge for empirical research on this topic is 
that a worker’s outside option set is not typically observed. 
Even within the same firm and occupation, workers may face 
different options because of their specific set of skills, their 
preferences, or their constraints. As a result, little is known 
about which workers have better outside options and what 
role options play in generating wage inequality. 
The first contribution of this paper is to develop an empir-
ical procedure to uncover a key latent parameter in most 
wage-setting models: the value of an individual’s option set. 
We show how this latent parameter can be derived from the 
cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across jobs. 
If similar workers are concentrated in a certain region, indus-
try, occupation, or other job characteristics, then the worker’s 
options are more limited. We quantify this concentration 
in a single “outside options index” (OOI). We show that in 
a matching model of heterogeneous workers and jobs, this 
OOI is a sufficient statistic for the effect of outside options 
on compensation, when holding productivity constant. We 
then estimate the OOI for every worker using administrative 
matched employer-employee data from a 1 percent repre-
sentative sample of workers in Germany. Examining the dis-
tribution of the OOI, we find which workers’ characteristics 
are associated with better outside options. Next, we quantify 
the impact on wages by estimating the elasticity between the 
OOI and wages using two quasi-random sources of variation 
in the OOI, which holds workers’ productivity constant: the 
introduction of high-speed commuter-rails and a shift-share 
(“Bartik”) instrument. 
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Our second contribution is to show that differences in out-
side options explain a substantial portion—30 percent—of the 
gender wage gap in Germany. This gender difference is driven 
entirely by differences in willingness to commute or move. 
We start by outlining a static model of the labor market 
that illustrates how, with two-sided heterogeneity, differences 
in outside options lead to differences in compensation, even 
for equally productive workers. Our model is based on the 
classic Shapley and Shubik (1971) assignment game—a two-
sided matching model with transfers. Compensation in this 
setting is set to prevent workers from moving to their outside 
options; because of heterogeneity, this will be below their 
full productivity in the first-best option. 
We derive a sufficient statistic from this model, the OOI, 
which summarizes the impact of options on compensation. 
It measures the quantity of relevant jobs for a given worker. 
If a worker gets access to more similar jobs, their compen-
sation would increase by exactly the increase in OOI times 
a constant elasticity, even though their productivity remains 
constant. The OOI depends on two factors: the supply of jobs 
and worker flexibility (i.e., a worker’s ability or willing-
ness to take jobs in more places, more occupations, or more 
industries). Workers with more relevant jobs, as captured by 
the OOI, will have on average a better outside option, and 
will also be able to sort into better matches, conditional on 
their productivity. 
We show that the OOI is equal to a standard concentration 
index: workers with more options are those who, in equilib-
rium, are found in a greater variety of jobs. Under standard 
assumptions on the distribution of match quality (Choo and 
Siow 2006; Dupuy and Galichon 2014), the OOI is equal to 
the entropy index. This index, with a negative sign, is used in 
the industrial organization literature as a measure of market 
concentration (Tirole 1988), similar to the Herfindhal- 
Hirschman Index (HHI), which has also been used to mea-
sure concentration in labor markets (Azar, Marinescu, and 
Steinbaum 2017; Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim 2018). In 
contrast to most concentration indices, our index is not mea-
sured on a specific dimension, such as occupation or indus-
try. Instead, workers’ and firms’ characteristics are allowed to 
vary continuously; this allows for the fact that some workers 
may have employment opportunities in different occupations 
or industries or in different geographic areas. Options are 
estimated in equilibrium, based on matches we observe in 
cross-sectional data. To isolate the effect of more options 
from the effect of productivity, the OOI is calculated without 
using any information on wages or wage offers. 
We then develop a method to estimate the OOI for each 
worker in the labor market, which is computationally feasi-
ble even in large data sets. The OOI is a function of the joint 
probability of every worker to be in every job. Our method 
estimates this probability using the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of similar workers. We show that this problem can be 
translated into a logistic regression framework. We then use 
the fast implementation of logistic regressions to estimate 
the probabilities for every worker-job combination. From 
those probabilities we can directly calculate the OOI for each 
worker. 
We use the OOI to analyze the impact of outside options 
on inequality, starting with identification of which workers 
have better outside options. Specifically, we estimate the 
OOI for every worker in a representative sample of German 
workers in 2014 using administrative linked employer- 
employee data. In order to validate our measure, we show 
that the OOI predicts which workers are less affected by a 
mass layoff: workers with better outside options recover 
more quickly from a displacement. Because we do not use 
wages to calculate the OOI, there is not a mechanical link 
between the OOI and wages. 
We use two sources of variation in options to estimate the 
elasticity between the OOI and wages: 1) the introduction of 
high-speed commuter rail stations (Heuermann and Schmie-
der 2018), and 2) a standard industry shift-share (“Bartik”) 
instrument (Beaudry, Green, and Sand 2012). These instru-
ments allow us to identify the elasticity between our OOI 
and wages. The first instrument uses the introduction of 
new commuter rail in small German towns. These stations, 
located along existing routes, effectively increased the labor 
market size for workers in small cities who happened to live 
on routes between major German cities. Prior work showed 
that the exact choice of town was largely driven by politi-
cal considerations (Heuermann and Schmieder 2018). The 
second instrument uses differences in exposure to industry 
growth trends between local labor markets. We compare 
workers who work in the same industry but have outside 
options in different industries because they reside in differ-
ent parts of the country. Both instruments yield a similar 
semielasticity of roughly 0.17–0.32 between the OOI and 
wages. Further, while the new train stations have the largest 
impact on the options of highly skilled workers, the elasticity 
does not vary across education groups.8
Combining this elasticity with the estimated distribution 
of the OOI, we find that differences in outside options lead to 
wage inequality. Differences in options lower compensation 
for women (immigrants) by 6 (8) percentage points. This 
explains roughly 30 percent (88 percent) of the overall gap in 
Germany. We also find large effects that graduates of higher- 
secondary education have greater outside options, which 
increases their compensation by 7 percentage points (one-
fourth of the total return).9
Finally, the last part of the paper examines why certain 
groups of workers have better options than others. We find 
that heterogeneity in the ability or willingness to commute 
can account for the full gender gap in outside options. We 
also find that without their higher willingness to work at 
more distant jobs, highly educated workers would actually 
have fewer options. This is likely because their skills tend to 
be more industry specific. 
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Chapter 3
Monopsony and the Gender Wage Gap: 
Experimental Evidence from the Gig Economy 
(with Emily Oehlsen)
The third chapter also investigates the relationship 
between imperfect competition in the labor market and 
between-group wage inequality. When the labor market is 
not perfectly competitive, firms are not price takers: in order 
to recruit or retain more workers, they must offer higher 
wages (see surveys in Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom 
[2010]; Bhaskar, Manning, and To [2002]; Boal and Ransom 
[1997]; Manning [2003]). Firms have an incentive to pay 
higher wages to workers that are harder to recruit or retain 
(workers that are more elastic to the firm), even if they are no 
more productive than other workers.
The idea that imperfect competition in the labor market 
could lead to a gender wage gap dates back to Joan Robin-
son’s 1933 book, in which she coined the term monopsony. 
Women may earn less than men if they are, on average, less 
willing to leave their employer in response to changes in firm 
and market conditions (Card et al. 2016).10 This could be true 
if women face smaller effective labor markets due to discrim-
ination or commuting costs, or if they are less aggressive or 
strategic about taking advantage of new opportunities (Bab-
cock and Laschever 2009; Card, Cardoso, and Kline 2016).
In this chapter we use data from a series of randomized 
experiments conducted at Uber to produce new evidence on 
the elasticity of men and women’s labor supply, to both the 
firm and the market. We use these elasticities to test whether 
gender differences in firm-specific elasticities might contrib-
ute to a gender wage gap. The key advantage of the Uber 
setting is that we are able to generate exogenous variation in 
wages in a setting where it is clear what the alternative firm 
is: Lyft. 
The first part of the chapter outlines a theoretical model 
that allows workers to adjust both how much they work (par-
ticipation and hours) and for whom (firm substitution). The 
model illustrates that when hours are flexible, the optimal 
wage markdown depends on both the traditional firm sub-
stitution/recruitment elasticity and how responsive workers’ 
total hours are to changes in wages. The first elasticity mea-
sures the extent to which workers join or leave individual 
firms in response to changes in relative wages. The second 
measures the extent to which workers increase their overall 
labor supply (at the expense of leisure) in response to wage 
changes. We show that these two sets of elasticities are suf-
ficient to calculate the optimal wage gap in a setting where 
hours are flexible and in a setting where they are not. 
We structured our experiments so that we were able to 
estimate each of these elasticities. In these experiments 
we offered random subsets of male and female drivers the 
opportunity to have 25–39 percent higher wages for a week. 
While some drivers had access to a competing ride-share 
company (Lyft), others did not. Some of this variation comes 
from the fact that Lyft temporarily left the Houston market. 
We conducted one experiment while Lyft was out of this 
market and another experiment after Lyft had returned. Some 
of this variation comes from the fact that some Uber drivers 
are, because of the age of their vehicle, ineligible to drive for 
Lyft. Drivers in our experiments received offers by e-mail 
and text message, as well as through the Uber application 
itself. Because drivers were required to opt-in in order to 
receive the wage increase, we are able to account for inatten-
tion as a possible confounder (Mas and Pallais 2018). 
We first use data from the experiment conducted when Lyft 
was out of the market to estimate Frisch elasticities for men 
and women. While these elasticities serve as a baseline for 
our analysis of firm substitution, they are also of independent 
interest as they are a key component of most business cycle 
models. And despite the large volume of research on male and 
female labor supply, there is little quasi-experimental or exper-
imental evidence that intensive or extensive margin Frisch 
elasticities differ by gender (Killingsworth and Heckman 
1986; McClelland and Mok 2012).11
We find that women have Frisch (market-level) elasticities 
double those of men. In response to a 10 percent increase in 
wages, female drivers work 7 percent more hours (ε = 0.7) 
while male drivers work only 3 percent more hours (ε = 0.3). 
The results are not driven by baseline differences in usual 
hours worked or by differences in age. Our estimate of the 
Frisch elasticity for men is similar to the estimates presented 
in prior studies of taxi drivers (Farber 2005, 2015), but is 
somewhat smaller than estimates in similar experiments 
(Fehr and Goette 2007). We argue that this may be due, in 
part, to the fact that it is typically difficult to observe part-
time workers shifting hours across firms or platforms. The 
extensive margin elasticities are modest, even among our 
sample of marginally attached drivers. In response to a 10 
percent increase in wages, women are at most 2 percentage 
points more likely to drive (an elasticity of at most 0.18), 
relative to a single percentage point for men (at most 0.09).12
To assess firm substitution, we then compare these  
market-level Frisch elasticities to estimates from two similar 
experiments where only a subset of the drivers cannot drive 
for Lyft. Because the estimates from these experiments are 
not precise, we also use data from a large Uber-run promo-
tion we call the “individual driver bonus” to corroborate our 
findings. Using both sets of data we find that drivers with 
the opportunity to work for competing platforms are signifi-
cantly more elastic. This likely reflects the fact that some of 
their hours do not come from leisure but from Lyft. The gap 
between the elasticities for drivers who could and could not 
access Lyft is particularly pronounced for younger drivers, 
who are likely more adept with the technologies Uber and 
Lyft use. 
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We use the elasticities for drivers who could and could 
not drive for Lyft to compute implied firm substitution 
elasticities for men and women. We find mean elasticities 
between two and four. These estimates are in line with other 
recent estimates of firm-specific elasticities, and suggest 
optimal markdowns of between 20 and 33 percent.13 Our low 
elasticities reflect the fact that, even in this setting, switching 
between firms is not trivial. 
In contrast to prior nonexperimental work, we do not 
see any significant differences in firm-specific elasticities 
between men and women (Hirsch, Schank, and Schnabel 
2010; Ransom and Oaxaca 2010; Webber 2016). Our results 
suggest that, even if gig economy firms wield monopsony 
power, they do not have any incentive to pay women less. 
This is true even in a world where hours are not flexible. 
We view these estimates as a lower bound on the extent to 
which monopsonistic firms outside of the gig economy might 
be incentivized to pay women less than men. Our results sug-
gest that women are no less strategic about taking advantage 
of the opportunity to earn higher wages. However, in other 
contexts, women may face higher commuting costs or con-
straints, which could result in lower firm-specific elasticities, 
and thus lower wages. The results in Chapter 2 suggest that 
the impact of these constraints can be sizable. 
Notes
 1. This is explicit in models where wages are determined by 
bargaining between an individual and a firm or a union and 
a firm (Acemoglu 2001; Farber 1987; Pissarides 2000). It is 
implicit in models with posting; in these models, the wage a 
firm chooses to post depends on the wages chosen by other 
firms (Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Manning 2003).
 2. Prior work has largely exploited industry- and region-level 
variation (see, e.g., Beaudry, Green, and Sand 2012; Bidner 
and Sand 2016; Fortin and Lemieux 2015; Hagedorn and 
Manovskii 2013). Contemporaneous work by Jäger et al. 
(2018) shows that there is no link between the value of non- 
employment and wages.
 3. Similar facts were presented in prior work by Myers and 
Shultz (1951), Rees (1966), and Rees and Shultz (1970).
 4. Our data cover the period 2008–2016. Most wage decentraliza-
tion occurred in the 1990s. 
 5. Because our data are monthly, the base rate is low: roughly 1 
percent of workers make a job-to-job transition each month.
 6. In a separate set of robustness checks we show that we obtain 
similar qualitative results when exploiting measures that are 
based on changes in world demand for the products exported 
by an individual’s former coworkers’ firms (Garin and Silverio 
2018; Hummels et al. 2014).
 7. The eight groups are 1) managers, 2) professionals, 3) techni-
cians and associate professionals, 4) clerical support workers, 
5) service and sales workers, 6) craft and related trade workers, 
7) plant and machine operators, and 8) assembly workers.
 8. The fact that highly educated workers’ options are most 
affected is not surprising; tickets on these trains are fairly 
expensive.
 9. The level that grants a certificate allowing college admission.
 10. Similarly, search models predict that workers with lower 
arrival rates of job offers earn less in equilibrium (Black 1995).
 11. While a few studies have exploited temporary wage variation 
in settings where workers can freely choose their hours, the 
populations in these studies are predominantly male (Farber 
2005, 2015; Fehr and Goette 2007; Oettinger 1999; Stafford 
2015). Though most (more than 85 percent) of Uber drivers are 
male, we structured our experiment to include roughly equal 
numbers of male and female drivers and to include both part- 
and full-time drivers (Hall and Krueger 2015).
 12. These elasticities are significantly smaller than those typically 
used to calibrate dynamic models; these models typically 
assume an elasticity greater than 1 (Chetty et al. 2013; King 
and Rebelo 1999).
 13. Dube et al. (forthcoming) use a bunching estimator to derive 
labor supply elasticities from administrative wage data and the 
CPS. They report estimates of two and three (Table 3, Panel B) 
for moderate values of optimization frictions.
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